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Notions of “Value” in Healthcare
Aggregate Distributional Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Health
Technologies
James Love-Koh, PhD,* Richard Cookson, PhD, Nils Gutacker, PhD, Thomas Patton, PhD, Susan Grifﬁn, PhD
Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, England, UK.
A B S T R A C T
Background: Health inequalities can be partially addressed through the range of treatments funded by health systems.
Nevertheless, although health technology assessment agencies assess the overall balance of health beneﬁts and costs, no
quantitative assessment of health inequality impact is consistently undertaken.
Objectives: To assess the inequality impact of technologies recommended under the NICE single technology appraisal process
from 2012 to 2014 using an aggregate distributional cost-effectiveness framework.
Methods: Data on health beneﬁts, costs, and patient populations were extracted from the NICE website. Beneﬁts for each
technology were distributed to social groups using the observed socioeconomic distribution of hospital utilization for the
targeted disease. Inequality measures and estimates of cost-effectiveness were compared using the health inequality impact
plane and combined using social welfare indices.
Results: Twenty-seven interventions were evaluated. Fourteen interventions were estimated to increase population health
and reduce health inequality, 8 to reduce population health and increase health inequality, and 5 to increase health and
increase health inequality. Among the latter 5, social welfare analysis, using inequality aversion parameters reﬂecting high
concern for inequality, indicated that the health gain outweighs the negative health inequality impact.
Conclusions: The methods proposed offer a way of estimating the health inequality impacts of new health technologies. The
methods do not allow for differences in technology-speciﬁc utilization and health beneﬁts, but require less resources and
data than conducting full distributional cost-effectiveness analysis. They can provide useful quantitative information to
help policy makers consider how far new technologies are likely to reduce or increase health inequalities.
Keywords: distributional cost-effectiveness analysis, economic evaluation, health equity, health inequality, health technology
assessment
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Introduction
Health inequality is an important policy concern in health
systems across the globe.1,2 England is no exception, with a
number of high-proﬁle reports highlighting the disparities in
health status between rich and poor members of society.3-5 Na-
tional policy makers and local third-party payers in the English
National Health Service (NHS) have a statutory duty to “have re-
gard to the need to reduce inequalities in the beneﬁts received by
patients,” which was formalized in the Health and Social Care Act
2012.6
In this article we propose a methodology for conducting
quantitative health inequality impact assessment for new health
technologies using aggregate data on disease prevalence and the
cost and health impacts of interventions. This methodology can be
applied in all jurisdictions where health policy makers are con-
cerned with reducing health inequalities, subject to data avail-
ability. We demonstrate this for one part of the English health
system that inﬂuences inequalities in the beneﬁts received by
patients: the single technology appraisal (STA) process used by the
National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE).
The evaluative framework used by NICE, cost-effectiveness
analysis (CEA), has so far focused primarily on the cost-
effectiveness of treatments in producing health outcomes rela-
tive to cost. Under NICE guidelines, health beneﬁts are measured
in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), a health metric that
accounts for quality and length of life. Costs, meanwhile, are
treated as health losses associated with forgone health services
because funding services from the NHS budget commit resources
that could have otherwise been used to provide alternative
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healthcare interventions. These health opportunity costs can be
represented by the value of existing NHS activities in terms of the
cost to produce one QALY. A new interventionwith an incremental
cost per QALY gained (ICER) lower than the cost per QALY of
forgone alternatives would there be expected to increase the total
health produced from NHS resources.
By only dealing with average health gains and losses, distri-
butional consequences are ignored. Health inequality impacts of
new interventions are not quantitatively analyzed or formally
incorporated into decisions made by NICE appraisal committees.
Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA) is a framework
that has sought to address this shortcoming by extending tradi-
tional CEA7 to estimate health beneﬁts and losses by social groups
of interest (ie, by socioeconomic status, age, or sex), which are
then combined to describe a population distribution of net health
effects. These net effects can then be added to the baseline dis-
tribution of expected lifetime health to understand how health
inequality might change as a result of funding decision.
Full DCEA requires the distribution of direct health beneﬁts to
be estimated from a decision analytic model or trial-based anal-
ysis using parameter estimates speciﬁc to socioeconomic groups.
This article outlines a simpliﬁed version that takes the average
gain from a CEA, scales it up using patient population numbers,
and disaggregates the population-level beneﬁts according to the
social patterns observed in healthcare utilization data for the
targeted disease.
Our framework provides healthcare decision makers and
stakeholders with an evidence-based technique for evaluating
whether new interventions can help to achieve the objective of
health inequality reduction, which can be used when conducting a
full DCEA is not practical or feasible. We apply this approach to a
sample of 27 interventions appraised by NICE over a 3-year period.
Methods
Overview
Our analysis used three sources of data, as shown in Figure 1.
Mean incremental costs and beneﬁts were extracted from the
manufacturer’s submission to NICE along with patient population
estimates to calculate population-level effects. Beneﬁts were
distributed between socioeconomic groups according to health-
care utilization patterns observed in Hospital Episode Statistics
(HES) for the relevant disease, identiﬁed by a 3-digit International
Classiﬁcation of Disease (ICD) code. Costs were converted into
health losses using a recent estimate of the marginal productivity
of the NHS, disaggregated into age, sex, and socioeconomic
groups.8,9 The difference between the beneﬁts and costs provided
net effects over the distribution of social groups. These were then
added, by both individual STA and collectively, to a baseline dis-
tribution of lifetime health that was also measured in terms of
QALYs10 to assess the impact on health inequality.
Data and variables
NICE technology appraisal data
Health beneﬁts, costs, and target population were extracted
for recommended treatments and their comparators within NICE
STAs issued between January 2012 and November 2014. Although
the Appraisal Committee bases recommendations on its
preferred or most plausible set of estimates from the range of
scenario and sensitivity analyses presented, these are often not
made explicit in the guidance documents and are not consis-
tently described across all STAs. The independent Evidence Re-
view Group (ERG) analyses also could not be used because they
did not systematically report incremental costs and beneﬁts
separately. Instead, we used the expected costs and beneﬁts from
the manufacturers’ base case scenario because these are consis-
tently reported across STAs.
Information was obtained from guidance documents, manu-
facturers’ cost-effectiveness submissions, and costing templates
via the NICE website. We excluded STAs from our analysis if the
appraisal committee did not recommend the treatment for
adoption into the NHS, it was an update of a previous appraisal
that did not change the adoption decision, or relevant information
was withheld on the grounds of it being commercial in conﬁdence.
The latter was typically the case when manufacturers negotiated a
patient access scheme with the Department of Health that
allowed patients access to the new treatment at a reduced price.
Where multiple treatments recommended for the same condition
were appraised separately, these were treated as independent and
no attempt was made to combine the results. Health beneﬁts were
expressed as QALYs. Costs and health beneﬁts had been dis-
counted at a rate of 3.5% in line with NICE’s methods guidance.
Information on the number of patients in England who would
be eligible for treatment was extracted from the costing templates
provided by NICE. The calculation of population net health bene-
ﬁts assumed that the intervention would be provided to all
eligible patients, which is the maximum impact consistent with
the recommendation decision.
Hospital episode statistics
HES is a database containing information on all NHS-funded
activity in public and private hospitals in England. We extracted
data on patients’ sex, primary diagnosis (ICD-10), and postcode,
where the latter was used to assign the patient a deprivation score
using the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). The IMD is an
area-based measure that calculates a score for all 32482 small
areas in England, incorporating information on 7 dimensions of
deprivation (income, employment, health, education, housing,
living environment, and crime).11 IMD scores were grouped into
quintiles and assigned to patients according to their small area of
residence. These groupings were used as our measure of socio-
economic status.
We used 2 years of inpatient HES data (ﬁnancial years 2011 and
2012) to count the number of episodes associated with 1562
3-digit ICD-10 codes that make up NHS spending and then dis-
aggregated them by sex and IMD group.
Health opportunity costs
Costs were converted into health losses using a value repre-
senting the expected cost per QALY of forgone alternatives in the
English NHS of £12936, taken from the most recent empirical
analysis of the health system’s marginal productivity.8 This is
lower than £20 000, the lower bound of the threshold range
adopted by NICE, which incorporates concerns relating to access
to new treatments as well as opportunity cost.12 We also used
estimates of how these forgone QALYs are distributed using the
results of Love-Koh et al9 who used disease-speciﬁc healthcare
utilization data to disaggregate the results of Claxton et al8 to
obtain the share of health opportunity costs by sex and socio-
economic status. They found that 26% of health losses are incurred
by the most deprived quintile compared with 14% for the least
deprived. Health losses also fell more heavily on women (55%)
than men (45%).
Analysis
Modeling net health changes
Incremental costs and QALYs were calculated between new
interventions and each of the comparator treatments for every
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STA. Costing templates for each STA show how current practice at
the time included a mix of the comparators and provide estimates
of market share (the number currently receiving each compar-
ator). We used these data to calculate population-level costs and
QALYs, weighted over J comparators in each STA t. The potential
net population beneﬁt of the new intervention in that STA, NPBt, is
then:
NPBt ¼
XJ
j¼1
htjptj2
XJ
j¼1
1
k
ðctjptjÞ ¼ PBt2PCt
where htj is the incremental QALYs, ptj the patient population, ctj
the incremental costs, k the cost-per-QALY of forgone alternatives,
and PBt and PCt the population beneﬁts and health opportunity
costs, respectively. By dividing through PBt and PCt by
P
j
ptj, we
obtain the “blended” incremental health and costs per person for
each technology.
The next step involves estimating the health beneﬁts likely to
be accrued for different sex and socioeconomic groups in each
appraisal. Each STA is allocated to an ICD code (or group of codes)
via its respective disease area (see Table 1). The distribution of
healthcare utilization by sex and socioeconomic group for each
disease is then extracted from HES. We use this information to
quantify the distribution of the total population beneﬁts (PBt)
across subgroups.
We then obtain the net beneﬁts from implementing each
technology by subgroup:
NSBtds ¼ PBtztds2PCtuds
where NSBtds is the net health beneﬁt accruing to deprivation
group d and sex s from STA t, ztds are the proportions esti-
mated from HES described above, and uds are the proportions
of health opportunity cost accruing to each subgroup. A
worked example demonstrating the calculations involved in
estimating the distribution of net population beneﬁts for
technology appraisal (TA) 260 can be found in Appendix B in
the supplemental materials (found at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jval.2019.03.006).
Inequality impacts
To model changes in lifetime health inequality, we took
estimates of quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE) at birth by
sex and IMD quintile group and added the net health beneﬁts
per subgroup for each STA (NSBtds) to the lifetime QALYs for
Figure 1. Inﬂuence diagram demonstrating how our data sources are combined to estimate the net distributional effect of
interventions.
NICE Technology Appraisal Data
Per patient costs and benefits and patient
populations for 27 interventions
Hospital Episode Statistics
Age, sex and socioeconomic
distribution of utilisation by
ICD  code
Population
health
benefits by
technology
Population
health losses by
technology1
Population
 costs by
technology
 Opportunity cost data
Age, sex and socioeconomic
distribution of marginal
forgone QALY
Distribution of health benefits by age, 
sex, socioeconomic status and
technology
Distribution of cumulative
health benefits over all
technologies
Distribution of cumulative 
health losses over all
technologies
Distribution of health losses by age,
  sex, socioeconomic status and
technology
Net distributional
effect of technology
Cumulative net distributional effect
Analysis Stage
Data source
Result
ICD indicates International Classiﬁcation of Disease; NICE, National Institute of Health and Care Excellence; QALY, quality-adjusted life year. 1Costs are converted into
health losses using an estimate of the cost-per-QALY of forgone alternatives from Claxton and colleagues8 of £12936.
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each respective subgroup to obtain a postintervention health
distribution:
Q `tds ¼ Qds1
NPBtds
nds
where Q `tds and Qds are the health distributions with and without
the technology, respectively, and ntds is the population of the sex
and socioeconomic subgroup. Combining each subgroup’s QALE
estimate with its respective population ﬁgure and ordering the
whole population from least to most healthy yields univariate
distributions of pre- and postintervention health.
Inequality measures
We used these health distributions to measure and evaluate
changes in health inequality and health-related social welfare.
Two inequality measures were estimated: the slope index of
inequality (SII) and the relative inequality index (RII). The SII
measures absolute inequality; an SII of 10 means that the
healthiest in the population experience 10 more lifetime QALYs
than the least healthy. RII summarizes the relative difference: an
RII of 0.1 would mean that the healthiest experience 10% more
lifetime QALYs than the poorest. The inequality impact is the
difference between the values pre- and postintervention: we re-
ported the reduction in SII/RII so that a positive value means that
health inequality has reduced.
Interventions were plotted on the health equity impact plane
to show the joint effects on health inequalities (in terms of SII
reduction) and total population health. Interventions that had a
positive incremental net health beneﬁt increased total health and
fell in the north of the plane. Interventions that reduced absolute
inequality as measured by the SII fell in the east of the plane.
Tradeoffs between inequality reduction and total health
improvement occurred for interventions falling in the northwest
and southeast quadrants.
Impacts on total population health and health inequality
were combined into a single index measure of health-related
social welfare using the Atkinson and Kolm social welfare
functions. Both measure social welfare change solely as a func-
tion of (1) mean health and (2) health inequality. The strength
of social preferences for reducing health inequalities is explicitly
captured through an “inequality aversion” parameter. In-
terventions that provide greater beneﬁts to the worst off will
yield greater health-related social welfare improvements as this
Table 1. Sample of single technology appraisals (STAs) used in the analysis.
TA Technology Disease area (ICD code) Inc. health Inc. costs Inc. ratio NHB Patients
245 Apixaban Thromboembolism (I82) 0.035 2£244 Dominant 0.054 91100
248 Exenatide Type 2 diabetes (E11) 0.085 2£282 Dominant 0.106 39765
249 Dabigatran etexilate Atrial ﬁbrillation (I48) 0.188 £1410 £7501 0.079 137124
252 Telaprevir Hepatitis C (B18) 0.974 £10 930 £11 226 0.129 17456
253 Boceprevir Hepatitis C (B18) 1.351 £8508 £6296 0.694 17456
254 Fingolimod Multiple sclerosis (G35) 0.693 £19 012 £27 429 20.777 2449
256 Rivaroxaban Atrial ﬁbrillation (I48) 0.039 £740 £18 974 20.018 137124
260 Botulinum Migraine (G43) 0.090 £543 £6033 0.048 35180
261 Rivaroxoban Deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary
embolism (I26)
0.019 2£258 Dominant 0.039 39828
265 Denosumab Bone cancer (C40, C41) 0.007 2£1351 Dominant 0.111 86656
266 Mannitol Cystic ﬁbrosis (E84) 1.570 £46 935 £29 895 22.058 200
267 Ivabradine Coronary heart disease (I50) 0.280 £2376 £8486 0.096 10466
275 Apixaban Atrial ﬁbrillation (I48) 0.241 £1326 £5498 0.139 452463
283 Ranibizumab Macular edema (H35) 0.245 £1581 £6457 0.123 10663
287 Rivaroxoban Thromboembolism (I82) 0.060 £591 £9821 0.014 18497
288 Dapagliﬂozin Type 2 diabetes (E11) 0.247 2£99 Dominant 0.254 155086
292 Aripriprazole Bipolar I disorder (F31) 0.007 2£686 Dominant 0.060 20
297 Ocriplasmin Vitreomacular traction (H43) 0.086 £1781 £20,777 20.052 954
303 Teriﬂunomide Multiple sclerosis (G35) 0.305 2£6200 Dominant 0.784 9780
306 Pixantrone B-cell lymphoma (C85) 0.200 £4759 £23 796 20.168 1650
312 Alemtuzumab Multiple sclerosis (G35) 1.101 2£3424 Dominant 1.366 6906
315 Canagliﬂozin Type 2 diabetes (E11) 0.111 £547 £4939 0.068 711444
318 Lubiprostone Chronic idiopathic constipation (K59) 0.001 2£20 Dominant 0.002 25500
320 Dimethyl fumarate Multiple sclerosis (G35) 0.240 £31 979 £133 523 22.233 4891
322 Lenalidomide Myelodysplastic syndrome (D46) 0.720 £17 677 £24 551 20.646 200
325 Nalmefene Alcohol dependence (F10) 0.071 2£397 Dominant 0.102 57820
326 Imatinib Gastrointestinal stromal tumors (D37) 1.430 £22 931 £16 036 20.343 170
Note. The incremental costs and beneﬁts are “blended” estimates, calculated by combining the estimates for each technology over their relevant comparators
and combining them into one ﬁgure, weighted by their respective market share.
ICD indicates International Classiﬁcation of Disease; Inc., incremental; NHB, net health beneﬁt; TA, technology appraisal.
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parameter increases. The Atkinson index, A
ε
, measures
inequality relatively and is given by:
Aε ¼ 12
"
1
N
XN
i¼1

Qi
Q
12ε# 112ε
where N is the total population, Qi is the QALE estimate of the ith
individual, Q is the mean QALE, and ε the inequality aversion
parameter that quantiﬁes the concern for relative inequality.
Alternatively, the Kolm index, K
a
, incorporates inequality on an
absolute scale, where absolute inequality aversion is represented
by the parameter a:
Ka ¼

1
a

log
 
1
N
XN
i¼1
ea½Q2Qi
!
Our analysis uses estimates of 10.95 for ε and 0.15 for a, based
on a survey of general public in England.13 The inequality aversion
parameter does not deﬁne a set of ﬁxed weights for different
groups; rather, they vary according to the level of baseline of
health. Given the current baseline inequality in England, an
Atkinson parameter of 10.95 implies that a marginal QALY gained
by the poorest ﬁfth of people is worth seven times more than a
marginal QALY gain within the richest ﬁfth. Social welfare is
calculated by combining each index with the mean level of health
in the distribution to obtain the “equally distributed equivalent”
(EDE) level of health:
EDEA;ε ¼ Nð12AεÞQ
EDEK;a ¼ N

Q2Ka

where N is the size of the general population and EDEA,ε and EDEK,a
are the Atkinson and Kolm welfare scores, respectively. The
equally distributed equivalent is the level of population health
(expressed in QALYs) in a completely equal distribution that yields
an equivalent amount of social welfare to the distribution being
evaluated. We calculated the EDEA,ε and EDEK,a pre- and post-
intervention, with the difference indicating the change in health-
related social welfare. Comparing the incremental QALYs to the
incremental EDE provides the QALY valuation of any change in
inequality. For example, if an intervention increases population
health by 100 000 QALYs and increases EDE by 101000 QALYs, the
reduction in health inequality attributed to the intervention is
valued at 1000 QALYs.
Sensitivity analysis
We investigated the possibility that the incremental costs
and QALYs cited in the manufacturer’s submissions may be
biased in favor of the new treatment.14 To do this, we used
results of Versoza et al,15 who compared the differences be-
tween the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICER) esti-
mated by manufacturers with those of the Evidence Review
Groups (ERGs) employed to evaluate the manufacturer’s ana-
lyses for the period 2003 to 2015. They found that the manu-
facturer estimates were £6200 lower on average than those
produced by the ERGs. We used this number to adjust our data
by calculating the additional cost required to increase the ICER
by £6200 and the reduction in beneﬁt required to increase the
ICER by £6200. Interventions that are health improving and cost
saving (or “dominant”) do not produce ICERs for adjustment.
For these interventions, we used regression analysis on the
sample of interventions with ICERs to predict adjustments
based on the manufacturer costs/QALYs (for more detail see
Appendix A in the supplemental materials found at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jval.2019.03.006).
One-way sensitivity analyses are also conducted to explore the
effect of the inequality aversion parameter and the size of the
health opportunity costs on results.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Of the 68 STAs listed on the NICE website during the analysis
period, a total 27 met the inclusion criteria and contained the
required data on predicted incremental health, costs, and popu-
lation (summarized in Figure A1 in the supplemental materials
found at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2019.03.006). “Blended” es-
timates of incremental health and costs, weighted by market share
across comparators, are reported for each technology in Table 1.
Incremental health beneﬁts ranged from 0.01 to 1.57 QALYs per
person and incremental costs ranged from savings of £6200 to
additional costs of £46935. In terms of net health, these blended
estimates yielded 10 dominant interventions, whereas the highest
ICER of £133523 was reported for dimethyl fumarate for multiple
sclerosis.
The distributions of healthcare utilization for each disease area
extracted from HES are provided in Table A1 in the supplemental
materials (found at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2019.03.006). The
average proportion of health beneﬁts allocated to the most
advantaged ﬁfth was 16.2%, compared with an average of 23.4% in
the most disadvantaged. On average, the interventions provided
1.56 times as many health beneﬁts to the most deprived ﬁfth
versus the least deprived ﬁfth (range 0.95-3.38). The net popula-
tion beneﬁts are shown in Table 2. Nineteen interventions had
a positive net health impact, the highest of which was apixaban
for atrial ﬁbrillation, with 62745 population QALYs.
Health inequality impacts
Fourteen technologies had a lower postintervention SII
compared with preintervention, indicating that health inequality
has been reduced. The biggest reduction of 0.00056 was found for
boceprevir for hepatitis C. Of the 13 technologies that increased
inequality, the largest increase in SII of 0.00085 was for apixaban
for atrial ﬁbrillation.
The health equity impact plane (Figure 2) showed that all 14
inequality reducing interventions were also health improving. Of
the 13 inequality increasing interventions, 8 reduced population
health. The remaining 5 interventions involved a tradeoff between
increasing health gain and increasing inequalities.
Social welfare analysis indicated that the 5 interventions
associated with tradeoffs between health improvement and
health inequality were estimated to have a positive impact on
social welfare (Table 2). The intervention yielding the largest social
value of reducing inequality was boceprevir for hepatitis C. The
potential inequality reductions for this intervention were equiv-
alent to 4818 additional QALYs on top of the incremental health
gain of 12109 QALYs (at Atkinson ε = 10.95). Across STAs, the
potential population QALY and EDE QALY increases were 207000
and 217000, respectively—yielding a total additional social value
equivalent to 10 000 QALYs.
Sensitivity Analysis
The effects of changing base case assumptions on the equity
impact plane location of interventions are shown in Table 3. When
the ICER increase of £6200 is attributed to higher costs, the
number of interventions assumed to improve health is unaltered
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from the base case, but the number of interventions that increases
inequality rises from 5 to 12. When the ICER increase is attributed
to lower QALYs, again the number that are health increasing is
unaffected, but the number that increase health inequality rises
from 5 to 8.
A movement from low (Atkinson ε = 0) to high (Atkinson
ε = 20) inequality aversion altered the ranking of 9 of the
interventions (see Figure A5 in the supplemental materials found
at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2019.03.006). The ranking of in-
terventions with pro-poor disease gradients such as hepatitis
C (252) increased, whereas diseases with no gradient, such as
atrial ﬁbrillation (275249), are demoted.
The joint impact of the cost-effectiveness threshold and
inequality aversion parameter is shown in Figure 3. The cumula-
tive social welfare impact of the 27 interventions becomes positive
between threshold values of £5000 and £6000. At a threshold of
£20 000, the change in population EDE ranges from 252000 QALYs
for ε = 0 and 278000 for ε = 20. When there are higher oppor-
tunity costs, more health is lost is in the poorest groups, reducing
any equity beneﬁts.
Discussion
Principal Findings
This study proposes a method to quantitatively analyze the
potential health inequality impacts of new health technologies,
with an application to 27 interventions recommended by NICE for
use in England. Although the distribution of healthcare utilization
determined the direction of the equity impact, the magnitude of
the impact was largely driven by per patient net health beneﬁts
and the size of the patient population. TA 275 (apixaban), for
example, had the largest negative equity impact and a patient
population of over 450 000, whereas TA 253 (boceprevir) had the
biggest positive impact and high net health beneﬁts of 1.35 QALYs
per patient.
Five interventions in our sample involved a tradeoff between
health inequality and health improvement. Nevertheless, when
these effects are combined using the Atkinson and Kolm social
welfare indices, a positive change in EDE was still observed for
these interventions, indicating that the increases in health
Table 2. Health, inequality, and social welfare impact of each technology.
TA Technology Population NHB Inequality measures Social welfare
measures
DSII (3104) DRII (3104) DEDEK,a DEDEA,ε
245 Apixaban 4917 0.769 0.0145 5243 5360
248 Exenatide 4230 0.463 0.0090 4621 4741
249 Dabigatran etexilate 10 834 22.595 20.0312 8903 8979
252 Telaprevir 2248 3.001 0.0431 4485 4728
253 Boceprevir 12 109 5.509 0.0840 16306 16927
254 Fingolimod 21902 20.471 20.0080 22310 22384
256 Rivaroxaban 22496 21.247 20.0192 23472 23606
260 Botulinum 1690 20.033 0.0000 1814 1868
261 Rivaroxoban 1541 0.143 0.0029 1662 1705
265 Denosumab 9661 1.406 0.0254 10841 11147
266 Mannitol 2412 20.095 20.0015 2506 2524
267 Ivabradine 1008 20.096 20.0008 935 949
275 Apixaban 62745 28.456 20.0866 56624 57477
283 Ranibizumab 1308 20.204 20.0025 1167 1186
287 Rivaroxoban 268 0.052 0.0012 206 202
288 Dapagliﬂozin 39436 3.971 0.0789 42821 43918
292 Aripriprazole 1 0.000 0.0000 1 1
297 Ocriplasmin 250 20.013 20.0002 267 270
303 Teriﬂunomide 7667 0.819 0.0156 8287 8503
306 Pixantrone 2277 20.035 20.0006 2336 2348
312 Alemtuzumab 9435 0.575 0.0125 9784 10018
315 Canagliﬂozin 48668 3.315 0.0750 51689 52922
318 Lubiprostone 60 0.007 0.0001 66 68
320 Dimethyl fumarate 210 919 21.761 20.0313 212 367 212 721
322 Lenalidomide 2129 20.046 20.0007 2165 2171
325 Nalmefene 5880 1.350 0.0237 6447 6598
326 Imatinib 258 20.029 20.0004 287 291
Note. Reductions in SII and RII are reported so that positive values indicate a more equal distribution; positive values of “Population NHB” indicate that the intervention
improves average health. Inequality aversion parameters of 10.95 and 0.15 are used to calculate the Atkinson and Kolm EDEs.
EDE indicates equally distributed equivalent; RII, relative index of inequality; SII, slope index of inequality; TA, technology appraisal.
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inequality are compensated for by the total health improvements.
Our results, therefore, do not conﬂict with recommendations
made from the standard CEA at the level of inequality aversion
used in our base case analysis.
Although the data on NICE STAs are systematically extracted
from published documentation, our results do not constitute a
comprehensive health inequality impact analysis of NICE decisions
over the time period. The assumption that treatments will fully
replace all comparators is optimistic in calculating population net
beneﬁt and is not anticipated during the STA process. Using the
incremental costs and QALYs cited by the manufacturer is simi-
larly optimistic because we expect them to be biased toward the
new treatment. When the manufacturer estimates were adjusted
to reﬂect the average difference in cost-effectiveness with the ERG
analyses, the population health impacts duly reduced, although
the number of interventions involving tradeoffs changed only
marginally.
Limitations
One limitation of our analysis is that we only used data on
disease-speciﬁc utilization to calculate health beneﬁt distributions
and did not include other factors potentially inﬂuencing social
differences in net beneﬁt—in particular, technology-speciﬁc dif-
ferences in utilization and health beneﬁts. Our analysis assumed,
for example, that all patients in need of treatment would receive
the new technology and that the probability of uptake was not
higher among socially advantaged patients who may be better
able to navigate through complex administrative systems like
the English NHS to secure access to the best available new
treatment.16
Using existing patterns of utilization may also be biased if a
new technology is expected to change patterns of uptake across
social groups. If provision of a new treatment is likely to increase
uptake in the most disadvantaged groups (as was argued in the
case of recent hepatitis C treatments17), then current utilization
would underestimate the beneﬁts to health inequality. Never-
theless, if data on expected uptake patterns are available, they
can be used to adjust or replace the healthcare utilization distri-
butions used to allocate health beneﬁts.
We also assumed that the incremental QALY gain of an
intervention was the same across all groups. If it is believed that
the incremental QALY gain would be higher in less deprived
groups, for example if they were to adhere better to treatment
or have greater capacity to beneﬁt owing to fewer comorbid
conditions, we may be overestimating inequality reductions. The
“full” DCEA approach can account for these additional sources of
inequality and can be recommended in instances where an
intervention is expected to change patterns of utilization or
when the direct health beneﬁts to recipients of an intervention
are expected to differ between socioeconomic groups. Never-
theless, the aggregate approach may still be informative in in-
stances where there are strict time and resource constraints,
particularly because committee members are used to adjusting
estimates of cost-effectiveness to account for factors outside of
the formal cost-effectiveness analysis, such as additional bene-
ﬁts not accounted for in the QALY. This simpliﬁed approach can
therefore be seen as providing a useful ballpark quantitative
estimate as a starting point for deliberation, on which commit-
tee members can then consider whether the impacts might
differ markedly in practice in the context of the speciﬁc tech-
nology in question.
A number of intervention comparators are not included in the
manufacturer’s submissions, despite the costing template indi-
cating their usage in clinical practice. For example, the costing
templates for TAs 249 and 256 suggest that nearly 1.4 million
patients receive either no treatment or aspirin for atrial ﬁbrilla-
tion. Because the incremental beneﬁts of switching patients on
these regimens to the new treatments (dabigatran etexilate or
rivaroxaban) were not captured, they were not factored in to our
analysis.
Figure 2. Equity impact plane showing the change in net quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) generated by a treatment and the impact on
lifetime health inequality, as measured by the slope index of inequality (SII).
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Table 3. Health and health inequality impacts of the 27
technologies for each sensitivity analysis.
Health/inequality
impact
Manufacturer
estimates
ERG-
adjusted
costs
ERG-
adjusted
QALYs
Increase health,
reduce inequality
14 6 10
Increase health,
increase inequality
5 5 4
Reduce health,
reduce inequality
0 1 1
Reduce health,
increase inequality
8 15 12
ERG indicates evidence review group; QALYs, quality-adjusted life years.
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Another feature of our sample was the lack of recommended
oncology-related interventions, with only 2 out of 27 for cancer
patients. This may be due to the operation of the Cancer Drugs
Fund (CDF) over this period. How this affects the results of this
post hoc review is uncertain because the gradient of any net
health beneﬁts depends on the type of cancer. Incidence ranges
from highly pro-poor for laryngeal and lung cancer, to pro-rich for
the likes of breast cancer and malignant melanoma.18 Neverthe-
less, our approach could be easily conducted within the appraisal
process by manufacturers or ERGs using the otherwise conﬁden-
tial estimates of incremental health and costs. Similarly, output
from probabilistic sensitivity analyses can be incorporated into the
framework to quantify the uncertainty around inequality impacts.
HES may not be an appropriate proxy for distributing the ex-
pected beneﬁts of a new technology for some diseases. For con-
ditions such as alcohol dependence or diabetes, the majority of
activity will take place in primary care, whereas mental health
treatment primarily takes place in specialist centers not included
in HES. If the socioeconomic distribution of activity recorded in
these settings was systematically different from that seen in
hospitals, then the net distributional effect estimated here will be
inaccurate. For this review we selected a single data source that
could be applied to all interventions, and we expect secondary
care utilization to provide appropriate proxy social distributions.
In future applications evaluating one indication at a time, access to
the best source given the particular context should be sought.
The mapping of ICD codes to some of the disease areas is also
inexact. An example of this is for the STAs 252 and 253 for hep-
atitis C patients. The most appropriate 3-digit ICD code for this
disease is B18, which counts all chronic hepatitis patients,
including hepatitis B, and may therefore distort the socioeconomic
pattern used to allocate health beneﬁts. Therefore, when using ICD
codes to map to disease, future applications of our framework to
individual interventions should consider the most appropriate tier
of ICD code.
Last, we did not account for parameter uncertainty in our
analysis. Estimates of uncertainty around incremental costs and
QALYs were not systematically available, nor for the proportion of
health opportunity costs accruing to each group. We could not
therefore reﬂect uncertainty in our results through probabilistic
sensitivity analysis, which would estimate the probability that
each technology falls in a particular quadrant on the impact plane.
Conclusions
Our analysis presents a novel and straightforward way of
estimating the health inequality impacts of health technologies
that can be applied in routine practice. This aggregate approach
demonstrates the potential utility of the DCEA framework in
aiding decisions to allocate funding to new treatments.
The approach we propose is highly ﬂexible and can be applied
to any intervention that can be mapped to an ICD code, spanning a
wide range of disease types. Where routine administrative data
are available, it requires little additional resource and can model
inequalities by any recorded socioeconomic characteristic. It is
similarly ﬂexible to evaluating inequalities with respect to addi-
tional characteristics such as ethnicity and age.19
Future work can also identify the most appropriate data
sources for each disease area. Depending on the intervention,
datasets that may better represent patients for diseases treated
mostly in primary care or mental health facilities could be used to
estimate the expected social distribution of beneﬁts. Where
possible, probabilistic sensitivity analysis can incorporate the
combined uncertainty from all of the core inputs to characterize
the uncertainty around the decision to fund an intervention.
Quantifying the distributional impact of new technologies,
despite the importance of health inequality to policy makers and
the general public, has not been undertaken in health technology
assessment. This study and the proposed method can help to
rectify this omission from the decision-making process.
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